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Trade Deficit Permits: Efficient Implementation of the Stability Pact in the European Monetary Union (Working Paper 7278)

This 58-page study from the National Bureau of Economic Research illustrates "a system of tradable deficit permits as an efficient mechanism for implementing fiscal constraints in the European Monetary Union." Author Alessandra Casella compares her system of deficit permits to the current Stability Pact, finding that her system seems to have more flexibility among the EMU countries, which would minimize the costs of fiscal target compliance.
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Date Issued 1999
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Scout Publication
Date of Scout Publication 1999-08-12
Archived Scout Publication URL https://scout.wisc.edu/report/be/1999/0812

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